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CASEY MARTIN, FORD OLINGER AND THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE THE LIMITS OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN
PROFESSIONAL GOLF
Christopher E. Tierney+
The Americans with Disabilities Act presents us all with an
historic opportunity. It signals the end to the unjustified
segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the
mainstream of American life. As the Declaration of
Independence has been a beacon for people all over the world
seeking freedom, it is my hope that the Americans with
Disabilities Act will likewise come to be a model for the choices
and opportunities of future generations around the world.'
Casey Martin and Ford Olinger are like many golfers in the United
States: they dream of playing professional golf as their career.2
Unfortunately, because their unique disabilities prevent them from
walking a golf course's traditional eighteen holes without extensive pain,
this dream is much more difficult to accomplish.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2002, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, PUB. PAPERS
OF GEORGE BUSH (July 26,1990).
2. See Mike Cullity et al., Special Report: Casey Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.,
GOLFWEEK, Jan. 24, 1988 at http://www.golfonline. com/news/golfweek/1998/january/
caseybio0124.html; see also Brian D. Shannon, Brief of the Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome
Support Group, As Amicus In Support of Appellee, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 93, 101-03 (1999)
(noting that while disabled golfers Casey Martin and Ford Olinger are trying to make it in
the world of professional golf, they are not the first disabled athletes to try to become
professionals); Jim Abbott, It's Easy to Accommodate, GOLF WORLD, Feb. 20, 1998 at 59
(highlighting the fact that the author, Jim Abbott, who was born without a right hand
played professional baseball for several years with two American League teams); Murray
Chass, Pro Football. 63 Yard Field Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1970, at 58; (explaining that
Tom Dempsey, a former place kicker for the New Orleans Saints, who was born with only
half a foot, still holds the record, along with current Denver Broncos kicker Jason Elam,
for the longest field goal in National Football League history).
3. See Martin v. PGA Tour Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000), affd 531 U.S.
1049 (2001) (indicating that Martin's disorder has caused such pain and atrophy that it
reduces walking to a potentially dangerous activity that could result in a significant risk of
fracture or hemorrhage in his leg); see also Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F.
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Casey Martin suffers from Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome4
(KTW), a circulatory disease that affects the blood flow in his lower right
leg.5 This lack of circulation has led to bone deterioration and atrophy
and puts Martin at a heightened risk of fracturing his leg. Due to the
increased risk of causing permanent damage to his leg, it is medically
unsafe for Martin to walk for extended periods of time.' Consequently,
for Martin to compete and play golf in the Professional Golf Association
(PGA) tournaments, he must use a golf cart to move between shots.8 In
the majority of their tournaments, the PGA has refused to allow golfers
to use carts unless the PGA Tour Rules Committee grants permission,
which it does seldomly.9 Therefore, in order to force the PGA to permit
Martin to use a cart, he has successfully invoked the protections provided
by Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 0
Conversely, Ford Olinger, an aspiring professional golfer having
virtually the same disability as Casey Martin, has not received the same
accommodation.' Olinger, like Martin, suffers from a disability that
Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ind. 1999), affd, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct.
2212 (2001) (finding that Olinger's disability severely limits his ability to walk the golf
course).
4. See Cullity, supra note 2 (explaining that KTW is a congenital and extremely rare
disease first diagnosed in 1900). In 1984, there were only 150 known cases of KTW
worldwide. Id. KTW is a vascular disease that affects the circulation of blood to the
extremities. Id. In Martin's case, blood recirculates to his leg and foot but does not always
circulate back to the heart, causing intense pain and swelling. Id. KTW is degenerative in
nature and doctors have advised Martin that his condition is likely to worsen as he ages.
Id. Accordingly, it is questionable whether he will be able to continue playing golf even
with the aid of a cart as his condition degenerates. Id. There is also strong evidence that
doctors could recommend amputation of the limb in the future, but the need for this is not
a universal diagnosis. Id. Currently, Martin wears a stocking to help support his leg when
he walks the golf course. Id. See generally Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, at
http://medicinenet.com/Script/Main/Art.asp?li=MNI& ArticleKey=6477 (last visited Oct.
30, 2000) (finding that there is little evidence to suggest that KTW is a genetic disease and
may occur solely as a result of certain birth defects).
5. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 996.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or. 1998).
9. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1249 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204
F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), aff d, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001).
10. See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
11. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000),
vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001) (holding that while Olinger qualifies as a person with a
disability under the ADA and although the United States Golf Association operates as a
place of public accommodation, he was nevertheless not allowed to use a cart because it
would fundamentally alter the nature of competition); see also Joe Cavanaugh, Despite
Similarities with Casey Martin Case, Olinger Must Walk, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 8, 2000,
available at http://www.empowerd.com/news/article.php3?articleid=84 (highlighting the
[Vol. 51:335
2001] Americans with Disabilities Act in Professional Golf 337
makes it medically hazardous for him to walk between golf shots.'2
Olinger's disability arises from bilateral avascular necrosis (BAN). 3
Similar to KTW, BAN severely reduces circulation to Olinger's hips,
causing extreme pain with any prolonged walking. 4 Although Olinger
takes medication that reduces the pain, a side effect of the medication
impairs "his lung capacity, dulls his senses, and causes fatigue," which
makes it even more difficult for him to play golf. 5
Ironically, despite the golfers' similar disabilities, a split in the federal
circuits has resulted in allowing only Martin to use a cart to help keep his
dream of playing professional golf alive 6
This Comment focuses on the Casey Martin and Ford Olinger
decisions, which have resulted in a split between the Seventh and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeal. 7 First, this Comment examines the legislative
efforts prior to the enactment of the ADA that attempted to provide
legal protection to persons with disabilities. Next, this Comment
analyzes the legislative history of the ADA, focusing particularly on the
statute's policy goals, by evaluating each of the ADA's relevant titles.
Finally, this Comment assesses the Martin and Olinger decisions in light
inconsistency in the two Circuit Court of Appeals decisions when, as the author indicates,
there is little difference between the facts in each case); Judge Denies Olinger in Cart Case,
SALT LAKE TRIB., May 18, 2000, at C3; Mark Hayes, Qualifying for Open Pains Disabled
Golfer, USA TODAY, May 24, 2000, at 2B.
12. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ind. 1999),
aff d, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
13. Id.; see also Aseptic Necrosis (Avascular Necrosis or Osteonecrosis), at
http://www.medicinenet.com/Script/Main/ Art.asp?li=MNI&AtricleKey=288 (last visited
Oct. 30, 2000) (mentioning that avascular necrosis is a condition that results from poor
blood supply to an area of bone, causing it to die). This condition is extremely serious
because the dead areas of the bone do not function properly and are likely to become
brittle. Id. The condition can be caused by trauma or damage to the blood vessels
surrounding the bone or an embolism that stops normal blood flow. Id. Treatment of
avascular necrosis depends on the stage it is diagnosed. Id. Early detection can be treated
surgically by removing the bone from the diseased area and grafting new bone to the area.
Id. Late detection, as in Olinger's case, leads to serious bone damage and requires an
extremely painful procedure that replaces the entire joint. Id.
14. See Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
15. Id.
16. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 531 U.S. 1049
(2001) (holding that the provision of a golf cart was a reasonable accommodation under
the ADA); Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001 (denying the use of a cart under the ADA); see also
Ashbel S. Green, PGA Appeals Martin's Use of Motorized Cart on Tour the Filing Before
the U.S. Supreme Court Faces Long Odds Despite a Similar Suit, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
July 6, 2000, at D5; Paul Novoselick, More Golfers are Facing Challenges to Cart Use,
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 20, 2000, at C2.
17. Martin, 204 F.3d at 994; Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001. These cases were decided
within one day of each other.
Catholic University Law Review
of prior case law and the ADA's policy goals. This Comment concludes
that both cases should have been decided in favor of the golfers.
I. THE ADA AND EARLY LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS AT ASSISTING
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
Title III of the ADA, the federal legislation that both Casey Martin
and Ford Olinger invoked in their suits, claiming that the PGA Tour and
the United States Golf Association (USGA) are obligated to permit
them to use golf carts during professional competition, was not the first
attempt by the federal government to provide redress for discrimination
against persons with disabilities. 8 Congress' first attempt to give rights to
persons with handicaps can be traced back as early as 1948.' 9
A. Anti-Discrimination Laws Concerning the Disabled Prior to the ADA
When many disabled veterans returned from World War II, Congress
enacted the Act of June 10, 1948 (the Act).0 The Act addressed
employment discrimination in the Civil Service against handicapped
veterans who suffered physical disabilities that occurred during their
service in World War I.2 Almost twenty years after this initial effort,
Congress expanded protection to those with physical handicaps by
passing the Architectural Barrier Act (ABA) in 1968.22 The ABA
provided that all buildings constructed, altered, or financed by the
federal government had to be accessible to individuals with disabilities.23
As a result of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and early 1970s,
24Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Rehabilitation
Act2l was much more aggressive than prior legislation at combating
disability discrimination, and it served as a template for the ADA.26 The
Rehabilitation Act prohibits the federal government, as well as federally
sanctioned programs, from discriminating against disabled persons."
18. Act of June 10, 1948, Pub. L. No. 617, ch. 434, 62 Stat. 351.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see also Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 387 (1991).
22. See Act of Aug. 12, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
4151-4157 (1994)).
23. Id.
24. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as 29
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Furthermore, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits any program
that receives federal financial assistance from discriminating against
28disabled persons. The Rehabilitation Act also requires that federal
executive agencies develop and update affirmative action plans for the
hiring and advancement of persons with disabilities.29  The most
controversial portion of the Rehabilitation Act requires the use of
reasonable accommodations for those with disabilities.30
In 1975, Congress supplemented the Rehabilitation Act by enacting
the Education of All Handicapped Children Act31  and the
32Developmental Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. Both acts
expanded coverage in the education arena by offering individuals with
disabilities new programs and equal access to educational facilities.
Despite its many protections for persons with disabilities, the
28. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). In 1978, an amendment was passed that expanded Title V
coverage to activities conducted by federal executive agencies and the U.S. Postal Service.
Id. § 794(a), (b).
29. Id. § 791(b) (1994).
30. See S.E. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979). An initial problem with
the language of the Rehabilitation Act was that it provided little definition of its
prohibitions. For example, the term "reasonable accommodations" was never specifically
defined in the Act. The federal courts did not aid in clarifying the confusion. For
example, in Davis, the Supreme Court determined that an accommodation is reasonable
unless it "constitute[s] an unauthorized extension of the obligations imposed." Id.; see also
29 U.S.C. § 792 (1994) (indicating that the Rehabilitation Act created the Architectural
and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, which oversaw compliance with the
previously established Architectural Barrier Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994) (referencing the
term "reasonable accommodation").
31. Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401, 1405-1420, 1453 (1994)). This Act
guaranteed children with disabilities equal access to appropriate public education. Id. at
775.
32. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103,
89 Stat. 486 (1975) (expanding the rights and programs available to individuals with
specific developmental disabilities at the university level). Other laws passed to aid the
disabled since the 1973 Act have included the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and
Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678 (1984) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)); the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat.
1080 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1374 (1988)); the Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B)-(G) (1994)); the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill
Individuals Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat. 478 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 10801 (1994)); the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102
Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)); and the Fair Housing Amendment's
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341, 2342
(1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3602, 3604-3608, 3610-3619, 3631 (1994)).
33. Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773, 775; see also Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No.
94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975).
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Rehabilitation Act had some significant shortcomings.34 Specifically, it
did not protect disabled persons from being discriminated against in
places of private employment. In addition, the Rehabilitation Act did
not protect disabled persons while using public accommodations,
transportation, and many state and local services.36
In 1977, approximately 3,700 delegates from across the United States
attended the White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals.
37
The conference focused on deficiencies in federal legislation directed at
disability-based discrimination, and encouraged the passage of an
amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act that would protect persons with
physical or mental disabilities as a group.39 However, despite a concerted
effort, Congress did not enact such an amendment.3 9
Congress made another attempt to deal with some of the inadequacies
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when it enacted legislation in 1978 that
established a National Council on the Handicapped (Council) in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 40 The Council was
charged with reviewing all federal laws and programs that affect persons
with disabilities and submitting a report to both the President and
Congress recommending improvements to the existing legislation.4'
In 1986, the Council released its report, entitled Toward
Independence.4 The report contained close to fifty recommendations to
Congress aimed at supplementing current disability laws.43 The Council's
primary recommendation was to draft the ADA.44 As part of its findings,
the Council recommended that Congress "enact a comprehensive law
34. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355. For example,
under the Rehabilitation Act, it was still possible to discriminate against those with
disabilities in private places of employment and many non-federal arenas. Id. at 394.
35. Id.
36. Weicker, supra note 21, at 388 (1991).
37. The White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals: Summary Final
Report 1 (1977).
38. Id. at 115-16.
39. Id.
40. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, 2977 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 780-786 (1994)). In 1984, additional amendments were added that reestablished
the Council as an independent agency to serve as the leader in federal disability policy.
See Rehabilitation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-221, 98 Stat. 17, 26 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 780 (1994)).
41. See Rehabilitation Amendments of 1984, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-221,98 Stat. 17, 26
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 780 (1994).
42. See National Council on the Handicapped, Toward Independence (1986).
43. Id. at 11-39.
44. Id. at 11.
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requiring equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities, with broad
coverage and setting clear, consistent, and enforceable standards
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of [a] handicap., 45  Such
recommendations would serve as the guide for the construction and
passage of the ADA.46
Based in part on the Council's recommendations, ADA legislation was
introduced in both houses of Congress in 1988.4' However, despite
strong bipartisan support for the measure, the initiative died because it
failed to reach a vote in either house before the end of the legislative
41
session.
B. The Final Product: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
1. Legislative History of the ADA
In 1989, ADA legislation was again introduced in Congress.49 Senator
Tom Harkin introduced the ADA's precursor in the Senate."' On the
House side, Representative Tony Coelho sponsored his version of
disability legislation." Over the next several months, both houses of
Congress held public hearings on the matter and worked out a final bill
in conference committee." After floor votes for the measure, the ADA
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See H.R. 4498, 100th Cong. (1988); S. 2345, 100th Cong. (1988).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See S. 993, 101st Cong. (1989)
51. See H.R. 2273, 101st Cong. (1989); see also Tony Coelho Supports Casey Martin's
Quest to Use Golf Cart, PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES, Feb. 3, 1998, at http://www.dol.gov.ztesxtver/archives/press/spring98/
martin.htm (quoting Coelho as saying, "[e]xcluding Martin on the basis of an arbitrary
rule prevents him from reaching the pinnacle of his career, which violates his employment
rights").
52. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2273
Before the House Comm. of the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Americans with
Disabilities Act: Hearing on H.R. 2273 and S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., I st Sess.
(1989); Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcomm. on
Surface Transp. of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); Americans with Disabilities: Telecomm. Relay Services, Hearing on Title V of H.R.
2273 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1989: Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. And Employment
Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989);
Field Hearing on Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select
2001]
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overwhelmingly passed both houses of Congress.53 In fact, over ninety
percent of the voting members of Congress voted for the legislation.54
President George Bush, Sr. signed the bill into law on July 26, 1990."
The ADA provides for a comprehensive national mandate to eliminate
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and ensures that the
federal government plays a leading role in the enforcement of that
mandate.56 In reaching this goal, the ADA has been called "one of the
Educ. And Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Hearing on H.R. 2273, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989:
Joint Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities and Select
Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); and
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989).
53. See 136 Cong. Rec. H4614, at H4629-30 (July 12, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. S9684, at
S9695 (July 13, 1990).
54. Id.
55. See supra note 1; see also Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1994); see also id. § 12101(a). Section 12101 indicates that in
creating the ADA Congress found that:
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities,
and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older; (2)
historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem; (3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such
critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services,
voting, and access to public services; (4) unlike individuals who have experienced
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age,
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have
often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination; (5) individuals with
disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including
outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural,
transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies,
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary
qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services,
programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities; (6) census data,
national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities,
as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely
disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally; (7)
individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society; (8) the
Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals; and (9) the continuing existence of unfair and
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most important and far-reaching pieces of Congressional legislation" in
recent history.57 What makes the ADA so potentially significant is its
breadth of coverage: it "applies to private employers of fifteen or more
employees, nonfederal government entities of any size, and places of
public accommodation. '  The ADA also includes provisions that
regulate certain areas of public transportation.59
a. Title I: Combating Discrimination in Employment
.... 61
Title I"" of the ADA generally applies to employment discrimination.
Congress designed Title I to prevent discrimination against a qualified
individual with respect to job application procedures, hiring, promoting,
or discharging of employees, as well as other employment privileges.62
The ADA defines a "qualified individual" as "an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position ....,,63 The statute
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for
which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of
dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non-productivity.
Id. § 12101(a).
57. William D. Goren, UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
AN OVERVIEW FOR LAWYERS ix-x (American Bar Association 2000).
58. Id. at 2.
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12150 (1994).
60. Jonathan R. Mook, 2 Americans with Disabilities Act: Employee Rights and
Employer Obligations, § 9.05 (Matthew Bender & Co. eds. 1998) (indicating that a
relationship exists between Titles I and III and requires that the two Titles be read
together despite that fact that Title I covers discrimination as it relates to job applicants
and employees and Title III covers discrimination concerning the general public, i.e.,
clients, customers, and patrons).
61. 42 U.S.C §§ 12111-12117 (1994). As required by the ADA, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission is responsible for the enforcement of Title 1. 29
C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-.16 (2000). These regulations were drafted because the EEOC was
required to issue guidelines and regulations to govern private sector employment within
one year after the ADA's passage. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b) (1994). Other areas covered by Title I include employee
compensation and job training. Id. Title I makes it discriminatory to deny a job or benefit
to an otherwise qualified individual on the basis of their handicap or to use qualification
standards for employment that tend to screen out persons with disabilities. Id. Further,
Title I defines discrimination to include limiting or classifying a job applicant in a way that
negatively affects the applicant's opportunity for employment and not making reasonable
accommodations for any known physical or mental limitations of a qualified employee.
Id.; see also Jean Fitzpatrick Galanos & Stephen H. Price, Comment, Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Concepts & Considerations for State and Local
Employers, 21 STETSON L. REV. 931, 942 (1992).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994); see also Johnston v. Morrison, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 777,
780 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (holding that a restaurant does not have to comply with the ADA if
2001]
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further states that the employer shall be given some leeway, but not
complete autonomy, in determining which functions of a job are
64essential. The term "reasonable accommodation" includes making
existing facilities readily accessible to the disabled, job restructuring,
potentially reassigning an individual to another vacant position, or other
appropriate modifications.
While its coverage is broad, the ADA does not require an employer to
give an accommodation if doing so would result in an undue hardship to
the employer.66 The term "undue hardship" is often difficult to define
because of the many factors that need to be considered. 67 The undue
hardship concept is a relative one: a certain accommodation may be
unduly burdensome to one employer, but not to another.6 While the
factors listed in the ADA are useful, they do not provide a concrete rule
of law.69  This generally results in courts analyzing the facts and
circumstances of each individual case and making case specific findings
to determine whether a particular accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the employer."
the claimant is not a qualified individual within the boundaries of the ADA). The
employee in this case could not succeed in her ADA claim because she could not perform
the essential functions of being a waitress, and thus was not a qualified individual in need
of protection under the ADA. Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
65. Id. § 12111(9).
66. Id. § 12111(10). See generally Jeffery 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers
to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodations and Undue Hardship in the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1991).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(B) (1994). The factors include: (1) the nature of the cost
associated with making the reasonable accommodation; (2) the overall financial resources
of the facility involved, the number of persons employed and the impact on expenses and
resources that the accommodation would incur; (3) the overall financial resources of the
employer in question; and (4) the type of operations of the employer, including the
composition of the employer. Id.
68. Id. § 12111 (10)(B).
69. See generally Steven B. Epstein, Note, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining
When an Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 392-400 (1995) (arguing that the ambiguities
inherent in the term "undue hardship" cause neither employers nor employees to be
certain about what level of accommodation the ADA really requires and proposing a
quantitative methodology for determining what is an undue hardship).
70. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that despite finding an employee had a disability requiring the employer to make
reasonable accommodations, the requested accommodation of working at home or
installing a computer at home was an undue burden in relation to the benefits of the
accommodation to the disabled worker, as well as to the employer's resources); see also
Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1284 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that an increase in medical
staff at the employee's worksite and the presence of an on-site blood testing facility would
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b. Title III: Leveling the Playing Field in Places of Public
Accommodation
Under Title III of the ADA, Congress sought to prohibit
discrimination' against individuals with disabilities who receive services
provided by private entities in places of public accommodation." The
create an undue financial burden on the employer); Frank v. Am. Freight Sys. Inc., 398
N.W.2d 797, 803 (Iowa 1987) (finding that an employer would suffer an undue cost burden
if it was required to hire extra employees to help unload cargo because it was unsafe for
the disabled truck driver to handle it).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (1994). This section states in part that discrimination
includes:
(1) the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out . . . an
individual with a disability . . . from fully and equally enjoying any goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria
can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered; (2) a failure to make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such
modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity
can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations; (3) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure
that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or
otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of
auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such
steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege,
advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.
Id.
72. Id. § 12181. Title III requires the Departments of Justice and Transportation to
issue regulations concerning the areas of Title III that are relevant to their jurisdictions.
Id. § 12186. Additionally, the language of the ADA requires that the Justice Department
periodically review compliance by private entities and investigate alleged violations. Id. §
12188(b). While this Comment does not analyze them, the ADA has three other Titles
which protect against discrimination: Titles 11, IV, and V. See generally id. §§ 12202,
12131-12134; 12141-12150; id. § 225. The purpose of Title II of the ADA was to prohibit
discrimination in the public service arena. Id. §§ 12131-12134; 12141-12150. Title II
specifically outlaws the exclusion of any individual with a disability from participation in
or denied the benefits of a public entity. Id. § 12132. The term, "public entity," as
referred to in this title, includes "any State or local government [or] any department,
agency [of that state] and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any
commuter authority .... " Id. § 12131. Title IV of the ADA applies to the Federal
Communications Commission and requires the agency to comply by providing special
services for those with hearing and speech disabilities. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994). Under one
provision of Title IV, any public service announcement that is funded by a federal agency
is required to include closed captioning capabilities. Id. § 611. Title V contains several
miscellaneous provisions that deal with issues such as state immunity and maintains that a
state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution from an action in federal or state court for a violation of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12202 (1994). Title V pertains to Congress and the agencies of the legislative branch by
setting forth procedures to remedy a violation of the ADA in the House of
Catholic University Law Review
Martin and Olinger suits against the PGA and the USGA relied on the
protections of Title Iil. 73 Title III lists the types of private entities that
are considered public accommodations for purposes of enforcement of
the ADA.74 Among the private entities covered by the law are places
like restaurants, museums, a variety of retail and service stores, places of
public recreation, and specifically, golf courses."
Title III requires private entities that are considered places of public
accommodation to provide reasonable modifications or accommodations
for disabled persons." However, if an entity can demonstrate that the
modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services,
or facilities provided, or result in an undue burden, the entity is relieved
from complying with this provision of the ADA.77
One early contention with Title Ill of the ADA, as applied to athletics,
was whether its provisions concerning public accommodations apply to
the actual playing field or just the areas surrounding the field and the
Representatives or Senate in matters of employment or otherwise. Id. § 12209.
Additionally, Title V encourages the means and use of alternative dispute resolution in
settling disputes under the ADA, through mediation, arbitration, and settlement
negotiations. Id. § 12212.
73. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001); Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 926, 930 (N.D. Ind. 1999), aff d, 205 F.3d 1.001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct.
1879 (2001).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
75. Id. Specific places listed as public accommodations are as follows:
[R]estaurant[s], bar[s], or other establishments serving food or drink; a motion
picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or
entertainment; an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
public gathering; a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store,
shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment; a laundromat, dry-
cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service,
funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy,
insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other
service establishment; a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation; a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or
collection; a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; a nursery,
elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other
place of education; a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food
bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and a
gymnasium; health spa; bowling alley; golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
Id.
76. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (1994).
77. Id.; see also id. § 12187 (indicating that in addition to the fundamental alteration
exception, private clubs and religious organizations are exempt from ADA requirements
governing public accommodations and services).
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stands."8  Several courts have held that it applies to both.79  Most
prominent in establishing this notion was Anderson v. Little League
Baseballt where a federal district court in Arizona held that Title III
applied to a coach's box on a baseball field." As a result, a disabled
baseball coach was allowed to use his wheelchair while coaching from the
field.8" In emphasizing the importance of the ADA, the court held that
the extent of non-participation by individuals with disabilities is alarming
and that Americans with disabilities must be brought fully into the
mainstream of society through "full participation in and access to all
aspects of society.,
83
Additionally, although a facility may not be entirely public because it
limits access to certain places, this does not deprive the facility of its
overall character as a place of public accommodation.84 For example, in
Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp.,85 a disabled
attorney brought an action against the owner and operator of a sports
arena alleging that the arena had violated the ADA and similar state
laws when it did not provide wheelchair access." A significant question
presented in the case was whether the arena's executive suites were
places of public accommodation within the meaning of the Act.8 The
plaintiff maintained that these "suites need not be open to every member
of the public in order to be a public accommodation., 8   The Oregon
78. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 121 S. Ct.
1879 (2001).
79. See, e.g., Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 483-90 (D.N.J. 1998); Tatum v.
NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96C6953, 1996
WL 680000, at *8-11 (N.D. II. Nov. 21, 1996) (holding, collectively, that the underlying
premise in cases of disabled athletes is that Title III applies to the playing field, not just
the stands).
80. 794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992).
81. Id. at 345.
82. Id. at 346.
83. Id.; see also H.R. No. 101-485(11) at 35, reprinted in 1990 U.S.S.C.A.N. 263, 316-17
(including comments from the Attorney General about the then current status of
Americans with disabilities).
84. See generally Indep. Living Res. v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 759 (D.
Or. 1997).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 758-59. The arena was ultimately charged with violating ADA laws that
govern the number, placement, and spacing of wheelchair spaces and that require the
arena parking garage to comply with regulations governing protruding objects. Id. at 707-
24, 779-80.
87. Id. at 758-60.
88. Id. at 759. The opinion also states that "[a] gymnasium or golf course may be
open only to authorized members and their guests, but that does not necessarily preclude
it from being classified as a place of public accommodation." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §
2001]
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District Court agreed with the plaintiff and held, among other things,
that the arena violated the requirements under Title III of the ADA and
determined that the executive suites were places of public
accommodation .89
2. Challenging the PGA and the USGA Under Title III
a. Casey Martin
In 1997, Casey Martin sought to join the ranks of the PGA by taking
the traditional route of earning his Tour card through the PGA's
qualifying school.'0 After making it through the first two of three rounds
of the school, which allowed the use of golf carts, Martin sought
permission to use a golf cart for the third round, which required players
to walk and use caddies." In Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.,92 Casey Martin
sought relief under Title III of the ADA because the PGA Tour 93 refused
to allow him the use of a golf cart during the third stage of the qualifying
school and potentially using a cart on the Nike and regular PGA Tours
should he qualify.
94
The Oregon district court granted a preliminary injunction directing
the PGA Tour to allow Martin to use a cart in the final round of
qualifying school.95 The court extended the injunction to permit Martin
12181(7) (1994) (listing places of public accommodation).
89. See Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 758-59.
90. Martin v. PGA Tour Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001). To enter the PGA qualifying school, a
prospective player must pay a $3,000 fee and submit two letters of reference. Id.
91. Id. at 1322.
92. 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), aff d, 531 U.S.
1049 (2001).
93. Id. at 1321. The PGA Tour is a non-profit association of professional golfers
headquartered in Columbia, Maryland. Id. The PGA sponsors and co-sponsors
professional golf tournaments on three levels: the traditional PGA Tour, with
approximately 200 golfers at any given time, the Senior PGA Tour, with about 100 golfers,
and the Nike Tour (currently the Buy.com Tour), with about 170 players. Id.
94. Id. The principle way of gaining access to the tour is through a three-stage
qualifying school tournament. Id. The top qualifiers are then invited to play on the
regular PGA Tour. Id. In the first two stages of the qualifying school, the golfers are
allowed to use carts, but not in the third. Id. When the PGA Tour denied Martin's
request to use a cart after he made it through the first two rounds of the qualifying school,
he filed for injunctive relief under the ADA. Id.
95. Id. If one does not score well enough in the qualifying school to make the PGA
Tour, one can still be eligible for the Nike Tour if the player is one of the next seventy best
golfers from the qualifying school. Id. As a result of Martin's play in the last round of the
qualifying school, he was offered a spot on the Nike Tour. Id. at 1322. The Nike Tour is
run by the PGA and serves as the junior version of the regular PGA Tour.
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to use a cart in the first two tournaments on the Nike Tour.96 The PGA
attempted to prove that it was exempt from the ADA because it was a
private non-profit establishment and, in the alternative, that even if it
was not exempt from the private status, PGA and Nike Tour
competitions are not places of public accommodation.7 However, the
district court found that the PGA Tour, as host of golf tournaments, fits
within the ADA definition of a public accommodation and is required to
make reasonable accommodations for Martin by allowing him to use a
golf cart.98
The PGA challenged this ruling in federal district court by relying on
two alternative propositions." First, the PGA argued that the ADA does
not apply to its professional tournaments because it was a private club
and its tournaments were not conducted at places of public
accommodation.0 Second, it maintained "that the requirement of
walking is a substantive rule of [] competition and that a waiver of the
rule would [] result in a fundamental alteration of its competitions...
,,,0, The PGA, citing limited case law arising from disputes involving
eligibility rules and not specifically involving the physical act of playing
the sport, 1 2 asserted that the court should determine that the rule
requiring walking in golf is one that does not define who is eligible to
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1323.
98. Id. at 1320-21.
99. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204
F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The PGA relied primarily on the following cases to support their challenge to the
preliminary injunction: McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 199 F.3d 453,
462 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that allowing a student to exceed the high schools eight
semester limitation on athletes was not in violation of the ADA as applied to a student
with a learning disability that prevented him from completing high school in eight years
because waiving the rule would cause a fundamental alteration in the sports program);
Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1995)
(maintaining that the waiver of an age regulation in high school sports would
fundamentally alter the athletic programs by allowing an older student to compete with
younger ones); Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 931 (8th
Cir. 1994) (determining that an age requirement was essential to a high school athletic
program and that an inquiry into the need for the requirement was unnecessary); Bowers
v. NCAA, 974 F. Supp. 459, 467 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that an abandonment of a course
requirement would fundamentally alter the nature of National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) programs). In Bowers, however, the court noted that a rule
authorizing waivers on a case-by-case basis was sufficient to accommodate students with
learning disabilities. Id.
2001]
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compete, but rather how the game is played. 0 3 The PGA argued that if
the walking rule is determined to be a substantive rule of the game, then
the rule cannot be modified without fundamentally altering the nature of
the competition.' This argument is akin to the PGA claiming that it
alone can set the rules of competition without concern for the provisions
of the ADA."5  The district court disagreed with the PGA and
determined that the Rules of Golf do not require walking and noted that
nothing in the recognized rules of the game, as determined by the PGA's
publications, defines walking as a part of the game.' 6 The court further
held that Martin sustained his burden by proving that his request for a
golf cart was a reasonable modification and should be allowed.' 7
The PGA appealed this second unfavorable district court decision to
the Ninth Circuit.' Beginning its analysis with Title III, the Ninth
Circuit found that Martin sought to enjoy the facilities of a place of
public accommodation."" The PGA did not dispute that a golf course
can be considered a place of public accommodation, but it claimed that
these accommodations are limited to the spectator areas." Based on this
103. Id. at 1246.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1248-49. The PGA Rules state under paragraph 6 (Transportation-
Appendix 1) that "players shall walk at all times during a stipulated round unless
permitted to ride by the PGA Tour Rules Committee." Id. at 1249. However, no written
policy exists for determining the Committee's discretion when making a decision to ride.
Id. Furthermore, the PGA specifically allows carts in the first two preliminary rounds of
the Qualifying School Tournaments and during the Senior Tour for golfers over fifty. Id.
at 1248 n.9.
107. Id. at 1248. The district court also found that because the PGA Tour specifically
allows the use of a cart in the Senior Tour and at the first two stages of the Qualifying
School, the use of a cart is not an unreasonable accommodation. Id. In addition, the court
noted that the NCAA and the PAC 10 Athletic Conference "permit the use of carts as an
accommodation to disabled collegiate golfers," thus lending credence to the idea that a
request for a cart is not an unreasonable modification. Id.; see also Johnson v. Gambrinus
Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (standing for the principle that the plaintiff can
meet the burden of proving that the modification requested is reasonable by "introducing
evidence that the requested modification is reasonable in the general sense"); Crowder v.
Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the determination of what
constitutes a reasonable modification is highly fact-specific and must be made on a case-
by-case basis).
108. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 121 S. Ct. 1879
(2001).
109. Id. at 996.
110. Id. at 997; see also Indep. Living Res. v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698,
759 (D. Or. 1997) (finding that while entry to a portion of a place may be restricted, this
alone does not allow a place of public accommodation to fall beyond the reach of the
ADA).
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foundation, the PGA then attempted to argue that because the general
public was not allowed to enter the competition area, the golf course
itself and the area Martin sought to use his golf cart, was not a place of
public accommodation."'
The Ninth Circuit, restating what was determined in the lower court,
held that while it is true that the general public is not allowed "inside the
ropes," competitors, caddies, and other personnel are permitted access.'12
Thus, the ADA should apply because the area inside the ropes is not
inherently private."3  Additionally, the court confirmed the general
holding of Independent Living Resources, that just because entry into a
place of public accommodation may be limited, it does not change the
facility's overall character as a place of public accommodation.'
4
After finding that the PGA tournaments were places of public
accommodation, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether Martin's use of a
golf cart was a reasonable accommodation under Title Ill."5 The court
also considered whether the use of a cart would fundamentally alter the
nature of future PGA competitions." 6  Upon holding that the
reasonableness of the accommodation had been answered in the district
court, the Ninth Circuit then addressed the fundamental alteration of the
game argument."7  The court reasoned that because Martin endures
greater fatigue even with a cart than the other competitors do by
walking, he gains no competitive advantage by using a cart and thus no
fundamental alteration of the competition would result."8 After its third
defeat, the PGA appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the Supreme
Court, which granted a writ of certiorari on September 26, 2000."9
b. Ford Olinger: A Similar Situation with an Opposite Result
While not getting the attention that Casey Martin received in his
pursuit of relief, Ford Olinger also sought ADA protection on the golf
111. Martin, 204 F.3d at 998.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 997-98; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: U.S. Department
of Justice Technical Assistance Manuals Title II and 111, 111-1.2000 (indicating that if a day
care center is run in a private home, the private areas of the home may still be deemed
places of public accommodation).
115. Martin, 204 F.3d at 999.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1001
118. Id. at 1000-01.
119. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 530 U.S. 1306 (2000).
20011
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course.20 Olinger is an aspiring golfer who suffers from a degenerative
hip disorder that significantly impairs his ability to walk.' 2' However, the
USGA' 2  denied Olinger's request to use a motorized cart in a United
States Open qualifying round in 1999.23 Olinger then filed suit in
Indiana, 11 maintaining that the USGA, like the PGA, operates places of
public accommodation, and that the assistance of a cart in the qualifying
rounds is a reasonable accommodation. 25 The USGA countered that it
was a "membership organization with no close connection to a particular
facility" and was "without affiliation to a place open to the public," and
therefore should not be considered a place of public accommodation as
defined in the ADA.'26  The district court disagreed and held that
120. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928 (N.D. Ind. 1999),
affd, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
121. Id. at 929; see also Judge Denies, supra note 11 (noting that Olinger's condition is
so severe that when he tried to play eighteen holes without the assistance of a motorized
cart, the pain was so intense he could not get out of bed for three days).
122. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1002 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that "[t]he USGA is a private, not-for-profit association of member golf clubs and
courses, chartered for the purpose of promoting and conserving the best interests and the
true spirit of the game of golf." Id. The USGA conducts tournaments in thirteen
categories such as the U.S. Woman's Open, U.S. Senior Open, and the U.S. Amateur. Id.
The U.S. Open is the men's national championship and has been held every year except
from 1917-18, and 1942-45 because of world wars. Id. The U.S. Open is held at a different
course each year. Id.; see also The USGA Story, at
www.usga.org/about/good-of the-game.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2000). This source
indicates that "It~he USGA has served as the national governing body of golf since its
formation in 1894" and is an "organization run by golfers for the benefit of golfers." Id.
Additionally, "[m]ore than 9,100 private and public golf courses, clubs and facilities make
up the USGA." Id. There is "fa]n Executive Committee of 15 volunteers [that] oversees
the Association." Id. There are "[more than 1,200 volunteers from all parts of the
country [that] serve on more than 30 USGA committees." Id. There is "[a] professional
staff of approximately 250 [that] directs the Association's day-to-day functions from Golf
House, the USGA's headquarters in Far Hills, New Jersey." Id. Finally, "approximately
800,000 players from around the nation are USGA Members." hi.
123. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 928. The USGA hosts qualifying tournaments at ninety
sites across the United States in the weeks prior to the U.S. Open. Id. The site of the
qualifying tournament changes each year. Id. The USGA requires that to participate in
the local qualifying round a golfer must carry a handicap index of 1.4 (shooting, on
average only 1.4 stroke(s) above par) or better for amateurs, or have status as a
professional in order to play in the qualifying event. /d. In 1998, 6,881 golfers competed
in the U.S. Open qualifying matches and 750 advanced to the sectional qualifier, which
consists of thirty-six holes that are played in one day. Id. In 1998, Olinger, with the help
of a temporary restraining order, used a cart in the local qualifying round, but failed to
place high enough to make the regional qualifier. Id. at 929.
124. Id. at 926.
125. Id. at 930.
126. Id. at 931; see also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (7th Cir.
1993) (the USGA relied on the majority in Welsh, which rejected the argument that
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because the USGA leases the golf courses where it hosts its events, it
qualifies as an operator of a public accommodation.
121
Upon finding that the USGA was within the ADA's reach, the district
court analyzed whether the use of a cart would fundamentally alter the
nature of its competitions.' The district court in Indiana came to the
opposite conclusion of the Martin court and found that while the game of
golf does not forbid the use of golf carts, allowing one for Olinger would
give him an unfair advantage over the rest of the field.129 The district
court found that there is a strong basis to conclude that a golfer who
rides a cart is likely to have some advantage when it comes to fatigue
over a golfer who walks, all things being equal. 30 Finding that the only
fair alternative would be to allow all U.S. Open competitors to use a cart,
the district court held for the USGA and prohibited the use of a cart.'
Olinger appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit.'32 In a rather
concise opinion, the court reiterated the points argued in the lower court
and again found that while the USGA involved itself in places of public
"places of public accommodation" include membership organizations lacking a close
connection to a specific facility, because the USGA rents the golf courses at which it plays
its tournaments); Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding
that local and national hockey associations do not constitute places of public
accommodation because they play their games in several different arenas).
127. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 931-32; see also Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football
League, 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that hearing disabled fans could not sue
the National Football League (NFL) under the ADA because the NFL did not own,
operate, or lease the Cleveland stadium that was denying disabled fans television
broadcasts of home games).
128. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 935-38.
129. Id. at 938; see also Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 n.9 (D. Or.
1998), affd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001) (indicating that the
rules allow for golf carts for the senior tour and for the preliminary rounds of the Nike
Tour).
130. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 935-36. Dr. James Rippe, an expert in the physiology of
walking concluded, based on a study of medical literature, that the average able-bodied
twenty-five to thirty-five year old golfer who uses a cart on an average summer day (eighty
degrees Fahrenheit with fifty percent relative humidity) has a significant advantage over
an otherwise average able bodied twenty-five to thirty-five year old who does not use a
cart. ld. at 935. Significantly absent from Olinger's case were the opinions of expert
witness, Gary Klug, who testified at the Martin trial about the effects of fatigue on golfers.
See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 52 F. Supp. 2d 947, 947-48 (N.D. 111. 1999). His
absence was a result of the USGA's successful motion in limine to exclude his testimony
on the basis of unreliability. Id.
131. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 938. But see USGA Makes Adjustment in Olinger Case,
May 18, 2000 at http://www.ilru.org/dbtac/BreakingNews-.html (indicating that the USGA
allowed Olinger to use a walker with wheels, instead of a cart, during the local qualifying
round of the U.S. Open).
132. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S.
Ct. 2212 (2001).
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accommodation, it did not have to comply with the ADA by allowing
Olinger to use a cart because it would fundamentally alter the nature of
the competition.
3
These decisions put the Seventh and Ninth Circuits at odds with each
other concerning whether the use of a golf cart by a disabled golfer
would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition. It is now up
to the Supreme Court to resolve the inconsistency among the circuits.3
II. Do THESE CASES EVEN BELONG BEFORE THE FEDERAL COURTS?
It has been argued that the ADA should not be used to regulate
professional sports because there is a risk that judicial tampering will
negatively affect athletic competitions.136  In fact, in its appeal to the
133. Id. at 1005-07. The circuit court relied heavily on the testimony of Ken Venturi, a
former professional golfer who won the U.S. Open in 1964 despite one hundred degree
temperatures and ninety-seven percent humidity. Id. at 1006-07. He testified that if
another competitor would have been riding a cart in those conditions, he would have had a
"tremendous advantage" over the other players. Id. at 1006.
134. See generally Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 121 S.
Ct. 1879 (2001); Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001.
135. You tell Us . . . Final Results, Casey Martin and the Cart, at
http://www.golfonline.com/polls/1998/martin0tI3/final.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000)
(indicating the results of an on-line poll that was conducted asking voters whether walking
is an important part of professional golf and whether carts should be allowed in the Casey
Martin situation). The results of the poll indicated that fifty-four percent of those
responding answered in the negative. Id.
136. See, e.g., Christopher M. Parent, Martin v. PGA Tour: A Misapplication of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 J. LEGIS. 123 (2000) (arguing that in light of prior
judicial determinations which held that sports organizations are not covered under the
ADA, the Martin decision will open the door to possible future ADA claims by
individuals of discrimination on the actual playing field of professional sports that may
thwart the ADA's chief objectives); W. Kent Davis, Why is the PGA Teed Off at Casey
Martin? An Example of How The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Has Changed
Sports Law, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 1 (1998) (arguing that the Casey Martin decision in the
Oregon District Court may encourage others to use the ADA as a means of seeking a
remedy from sports discrimination against the disabled); Radley Balko, Casey at the Bar,
AM. PARTISAN MAG., July 31, 2000, at http://www.americanpartisan.com/cols/balko
/073100.htm (stating that in light of the Martin decision in the Ninth Circuit, all of sports'
governing organizations should "sit up and take notice" because the courts have now
entered the business of dictating the rules of sport, and "sport as we know it will be subject
to the whims and discrepancies of appellate judges across the country"); Trey Garrison,
Court in Casey Martin Golf Case "Slices" Up the Constitution, DALLAS Bus. J., Feb. 20,
1998, at 62 (comparing the Martin district court victory to Kurt Vonnegut's satire Harrison
Bergeron, where the government sets restrictions on the most successful and talented
people in every conceivable activity so that everyone can achieve fairness and equality in
society). Garrison claims that federal judges have intruded into "private affairs outside
the scope of their constitutional powers"); see also Reed Mackenzie, Issues Raised by
Casey Martin Case Impact Golf at all Levels, at
http://www.mngolf.org/content-news/casey-martin 
_article.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2000)
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Supreme Court, the PGA maintained that no judicial body should be
able to interfere with and force the PGA to waive a legitimate
competitive rule in order to allow a particular individual to compete.37
Tim Finchem, the PGA Commissioner, has stated publicly that to give
Martin a cart will result in a competitive advantage.'38  He also claims
that allowing Martin a cart "is neither fair nor wise, and it is inconsistent
with a fundamental aspect of sport: that the playing field be level for all
competitors."
39
In addition, several professional golfers voiced their dissent when
Martin was allowed to use a cart after his initial district court victory.' 40
Even Fred Couples, one of golf's foremost ambassadors, called the
court's decision to let Martin use a cart a "farce.' '14' He further
commented that, "[i]f it works that Casey can play and use a golf cart,
what's to prevent anyone with a physical problem or any other ailment to
petition to use a cart?'
'12
(highlighting that Casey Martin's first case which was heard by Magistrate Coffin, a "non-
golfer," resulted in him deciding the case incorrectly). The author of this article, Reed
Mackenzie, was also the USGA Vice President. Id. But see Sean Baker, The Casey
Martin Case: Its Possible Effects on Professional Sports, 34 TULSA L. J. 745, 746 (1999)
(arguing that while the Martin decision breaks new ground it "will not have a detrimental
effect on the world of professional sports because of the unique aspects of professional
golf as compared to other sports, and also due to varying public policy concerns").
137. Associated Press, Martin's Case Going to Highest Court, USA TODAY, Sept. 27,
2000, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/golf/sgp/sgpfs27.htm; see also Patty
Maitland, Riding a Cart on Golfs "Unfairways": Martin v. PGA Tour, 29 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 627, 628 (1999) (arguing that the Oregon District Court's decision in favor of
Martin raises practical concerns for sports organizations that formerly possessed absolute
rulemaking authority over member participation because their previous autonomy is now
subject to the judicial interpretations of challenges from athletes with debilitating
conditions).
138. Mark Gray, Casey Martin and the Golf War, ABILITY MAG., at
http://www.abilitymagazine.com/alex-casey.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
139. Id.
140. John Garrity, Taking One for the Team - Battered by the Martin Case, Tim
Finchem Nonetheless Deserves Respect, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 23, 1998, at 63.
Quoted in this article was noted golfer Arnold Palmer, who remarked that with changes
like the one allowed for Martin, the Tour may disappear in the future. Id.; see also Lynn
Zmistowski, Golf is a Walking Game: Leave the Carts Behind, July 16, 1999 at
http://www.rockies.golf.com/walk.htm (adding to the critique of Martin's use of a golf cart,
Zmistowski argues that the use of carts will lead to the downfall of golf and compares a
golfer using a cart to be as illogical as a runner accepting a ride in a car).
141. Kevin Cook, Golf Plus/News & Notes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 23, 1998, at
G4. But see Doug Ferguson, Tour Should Save its Battle for Another Cart, Mar. 8, 2000, at
http://detnews.com/2000/golf/0003/10/03080045.htm (noting that while Arnold Palmer has
publicly made statements condemning Martin's cart use, he still invited him to the Bay
Hill Invitational, a tournament which Palmer hosts annually).
142. Leonard Shapiro, Martin Driven by a Will to Win, WASH. POST, May 28, 2000 at
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Curtis Strange, another well known golf celebrity, has echoed Couple's
feelings.14 He argues that riding a cart will almost certainly give Martin
an unfair advantage over the rest of the field.' 44  Strange further
commented that one cannot be sympathetic to Martin while still
protecting the rest of the golfers on tour.141
Some advocates of keeping the PGA course free from carts have not
been as civil as Palmer and Strange. 46 In May of 2000, at the Kemper
Open in Potomac, Maryland, one irate fan tried to start an altercation
with Martin over his use of a golf cart.
147
Juxtaposed with this onslaught of opposition are those who maintain
that the ADA has an appropriate role in rooting out disability-based
discrimination in professional sports. 4" Ben Crenshaw, the U.S. Ryder
Cup captain in 1999, and one of golf's most candid conservatives, said: "I
understand [the Tour's] point and they have their reasons [but] ...I
personally think they should drop it, and let him just get on with it and
play."'' 49 Senator Tom Harkin, co-author of the ADA, has weighed in on
Dl; see also Brad Neuville, Casey Martin: To Ride or Not to Ride, VIRTUAL MINER, Feb.
4, t998, at http://www.umr.edu/-miner/virtual-paper/980204/sports4.html (noting that
another legend who is opposed to Martin's use of a golf cart in PGA tournaments is Jack
Nicklaus). However, the author points out the irony in Nicklaus' position since he runs a
golf school in Florida for budding young golfers (called the Golden Bear Tour) where the
players are allowed to use golf carts. Id.
143. Curtis Strange, Strange Views: Protecting the Game, GOLF MAG., Mar. 1998, at
32. Strange writes that the PGA should reconsider why it allows golf carts in the
Qualifying Tournament (Q-School) and on the Senior Tour, indicating that in the latter,
players over fifty are more fit than they were twenty-five years ago. Id. Strange closes by
claiming that he has a responsibility to protect the game and that we are sometimes forced
to make decisions that are unfair in pursuit of this responsibility. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Kathy Orton, Martin, Fan Nearly Fight Over His Use of Golf Cart, WASH. POST,
June 5, 2000, at D9.
147. Id. The fan reportedly instigated the confrontation by shouting at Martin, "too
bad cheater," after he missed a birdie putt on the twelfth green. Id.
148. See, e.g., Todd A. Hentges, Driving in the Fairway Incurs No Penalty: Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc. and Discrimination Boundaries in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18
LAW & INEQ. 131, t37 (2000) (arguing that the ADA has a broad purpose and one that
should include professional sports despite its creation to remedy discrimination in the
work place).
149. Shapiro, supra note 142; see also Thomas Bonk, Love, O'Meara Think Tour is
Going to Lose Casey Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998, at C3 (noting that professional
golfer Mark O'Meara favors the PGA moving away from the Casey Martin case because
of the bad publicity it is creating for the PGA); Doug Ferguson, Tour Should Save its
Battle for Another Cart, Mar. 8, 2000, at
http://detnews.com/2000/golf/0003/10/03080045.htm (advocating that while the PGA has a
duty to protect its form of competition, it should let Martin use a cart because his
mediocre performance this year on Tour does not indicate a competitive advantage over
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the debate and indicated that the PGA's no-cart rules are "just another
way to systematically deny others the right to play."'5 Former Senator
Bob Dole lamented that the whole issue boils down to a basic question of
fairness and favors allowing Martin to use a cart.191
Despite these polarized views, there are strong arguments that the
ADA applies to professional golf. Since the ADA's inception, it has
been applied, although not always successfully, to several areas of sports,112 •151 154
including youth, high school, college, and recreational activities.'55
In addition to these cases, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits, while
disagreeing in their ultimate outcomes, both held that Title III was
the rest of the field and because of Martin's disability, his playing days are numbered).
150. Gray, supra note 138; see also Associated Press, Sen. Harkin: PGA Tour Should
Drop Cart Opposition, GOLF MAG., Jan. 1998, at
http://www.golfonline.com/news/1998/harkin carts0116.html (stating that "the PGA stance
could send the wrong message to millions of Americans with disabilities").
151. Gray, supra note 138. Former Senator Bob Dole suggested that "perhaps the
PGA should allow Martin to walk nine holes instead of [eighteen], or allow any player
who wants to ride a cart to do so." Id.
152. See, e.g., Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 344-45 (D.
Ariz. 1992); Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217,223 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
153. See, e.g., Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 94 F.3d 96,
101 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a mentally retarded student athlete entering his senior
year of high school at age nineteen was barred from participation on the swim team
because of a maximum age eligibility rule); see also Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities
Ass'n, Inc., 102 F.3d 1172, 1173 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding, under facts similar to those of
Dennin, that Johnson was a qualified individual with a disability, but a variance from the
age requirement would constitute a fundamental alteration to the program); McPherson v.
Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 462-63 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that
waiving the high school's eight semester limitation on athletes was not in violation of the
ADA as applied to a student with a learning disability that prevented him from
completing high school in eight years because such a waiver would require a fundamental
change to the sports program); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d
1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995) (maintaining that the waiver of an age regulation in high school
sports fundamentally alters the athletic programs); Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 1994) (determining that an age requirement was
essential to a high school athletic program).
154. See, e.g., Bowers v. NCAA, 974 F. Supp. 459, 467 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that an
abandonment of a course requirement would fundamentally alter the nature of NCAA
programs). Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96C6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *8-11 (N.D. Il1. Nov. 21,
1996) (holding that the underlying premise in cases of disabled athletes is that Title III
applies to the playing field, not just the stands); Butler v. NCAA, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1024
(W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that a learning disabled student athlete failed to establish
causal connection between his lawsuit and the actions of the association despite the fact
that he would lose his scholarship if he was denied eligibility).
155. See, e.g., Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 496
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that being denied a chance to participate in a bike race on public
city streets was not a violation of the ADA because the race organizers were not a
controller, operator, or lessor of the area where the event took place).
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applied properly to the golf courses used by the PGA and USGA. 5 The
Ninth Circuit even declared that if a golf course is not a place of public
exercise or recreation as the PGA maintained, it is a place of public
exhibition or entertainment, and Title III of the ADA applies
nonetheless.' The real issue then is not whether the ADA should apply
to the Martin and Olinger controversies, but how the ADA should be
applied.
5
A. Support From the ADA Language
In addition to case law, the language of the ADA presents a
convincing indication that the Act was meant to cover professional
sports. 15  As previously mentioned, Title III was specifically created to
deal with places of public accommodation. 60 It is undisputed that when
the drafters of the ADA created the list of places that were deemed
public accommodations for purposes of regulation under the ADA, it
chose to include gymnasiums, golf courses, or other place of exercise or
• 161
recreation. If Congress intended that the ADA not regulate sports, as
the PGA and USGA claim,6 1 it seems rather peculiar that Congress
chose specifically to list these sport venues in the text of Title 111.163
B. Prior Case Law: A Road Map or a Dead End?
Many of the previous decisions that apply the ADA involved eligibility
issues, and have not dealt directly with rules concerning the actual
playing of a sport.' 6' As a result, this presents a problem for the Martin
156. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 531 U.S.
1049 (2001); Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 2000),
vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
157. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 997; see also Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004-05 (indicating that
there may be some logic to the USGA's argument that a golf course, while being identified
as a public accommodation, may be properly considered a "mixed use" facility for U.S.
Open purposes). The USGA maintains that as a mixed use facility it is not subject to the
requirements for public accommodations. Id. While subscribing to this logic, the Seventh
Circuit never decided the case on this issue because it held that the use of a cart would be
a fundamental alteration of the competition. Id. at 1005.
158. See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *8-11; Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc.,
794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
160. Id. §§ 12181(7), 12182.
161. Id. § 12181(7)(L).
162. See generally Martin, 204 F.3d at 994; Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999), affd, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212
(2001).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994).
164. See generally McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th
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and Olinger litigations because the decisions in the two cases rely largely
on the testimony of expert witnesses.
One case, however, concerning the playing rules of a sport was
resolved in favor of a disabled athlete, albeit in a non-professional
context. 66  In Schultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 16 the
proceedings sought to answer the question of whether a youth baseball
program is a place of public accommodation, and thus obligated to
modify its traditional policies, rules, and regulations concerning age
limits to accommodate the needs of a child with cerebral palsy.16 ' The
plaintiff argued that in order to provide the child with an opportunity to
participate, it "is both appropriate for his needs as a person with a
disability that substantially limits his mobility, and equivalent to
opportunities provided to his non-disabled peers," to allow him to
participate in a lower age group. The California district court agreed
and held in favor of the disabled child. 70 The court ordered that the
child be reasonably accommodated by being allowed to play baseball
with children in a younger age group, even though the age requirement
had been a longstanding rule. 7' Thus, to level the playing field in
Schultz, the court mandated that an older disabled child could participate
with younger children because he gained no competitive advantage.
7 2
Similar to the disabled baseball player in Schultz, Martin and Olinger
asked the PGA and USGA to augment the traditions of golf to allow the
golfers an opportunity to compete equally with the rest of the field. 73 In
addition, like the impact of the modification in Schultz, permitting
Martin and Olinger to use a cart during competition will not result in a
competitive advantage. Like the accommodation in Schultz, the
Cir. 1997); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995);
Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Athletic Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994); Bowers
v. NCAA, 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997).
165. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1006-07 (7th Cir. 2000),
vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001); Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244, 1250-52
(D. Or. 1998), affd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001).
166. See, e.g., Schultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1225-26
(C.D. Cal. 1996).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1224.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1225-26.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1000-02 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 531 U.S.
1049 (2001); Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1.001-03 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated,
121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
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accommodation in these two cases simply brings all the competitors to an
even playing field and does not favor those with the disability.
Furthermore, while it could be conceded that mistakes could be made
and competitive advantages may inadvertently seep into athletic settings,
this is certainly not evinced by Martin's play while using a cart. 74 In fact,
Martin has not won a single tournament and is dangerously close to
losing his Tour eligibility for next season despite the use of a cart.1
7
1
III. CASEY MARTIN AND FORD OLINGER'S COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE:
FACT OR FICTION?
The PGA Tour and the USGA have argued throughout these
extensive litigations that giving either Martin or Olinger a golf cart would
result in giving them an unfair advantage over other golfers.176  This
argument is based upon the belief that by riding a cart, while other
golfers are walking, Martin and Olinger will gain an advantage in terms
of stamina and endurance over other golf professionals.7
This contention makes sense if the competitors are not disabled, but
the facts, as they relate to Martin and Olinger, are not that simple. 76
These cases raise the issue of whether competitive disadvantage
manifests itself when the player permitted to use a cart has a disability as
described in the ADA. 79 The answer to this question may depend on the
specific facts of each case and the condition of each golfer.6
174. Martin's Case Going to Highest Court, supra note 137 (indicating that Martin is in
serious jeopardy of losing his tour card by not playing well enough to earn an exemption
for next season).
175. Id.
176. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204 F.3d 994
(9th Cir. 2000), affd, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001); Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001.
177. Martin, 204 F.3d at 999-1000; Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005-06; see also Martin, 994 F.
Supp. at 1250-52. Perhaps the best evidence suggesting the fatigue that occurs during the
game of golf is a psychological phenomenon and not caused by walking was offered by Dr.
Gary Klug, a professor in physiology at the University of Oregon. Id. at 1250. He claimed
at trial, among other things, that "the fatigue factor injected into the game of golf by
walking the course cannot be deemed significant under normal circumstances." Id. Even
considering the circumstances of the 1964 United States Open, when golfer Ken Venturi
sustained near-fatal exhaustion, as a result of one hundred degree temperatures, Dr. Klug
maintained that Venturi's fatigue was the result of dehydration and heat exhaustion, not
the result of walking the golf course, since other spectators were treated for exhaustion
and did not walk the course. Id. at 1250-51.
178. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250-52; Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp.
2d 926, 928-29 (N.D. Ind. 1999), affd, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct.
(2001).
179. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250-52.
180. Id. at 1250-51
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In the case of Casey Martin, the district court found that the fatigue he
endures just from coping with his circulatory disorder while golfing is
undeniably greater than the fatigue suffered by the other golfers who
walk in tournament play. 8 Furthermore, the court emphasized the
tremendous pain Martin sustains while walking from his cart to the
ball.1 2 Literally, with each step, Martin puts himself at risk of fracturing
his tibia and causing severe hemorrhaging.83 Thus, even though Martin
is walking only twenty-five percent of the golf course, he endures far
greater fatigue than those who are able to walk the entire eighteen
holes.'8
Something critics fail to realize is that Martin's disability prevents him
from ever getting in better physical condition.'85 He is not a finely
conditioned athlete looking to conserve energy through the use of a
cart, 186 rather he needs the cart in order to compete at a basic level.
8 7
Martin must conserve the amount of time he spends walking and
practicing in order to have the energy to participate in regular
tournaments.'m Martin's legs are slowly deteriorating and the length of
his professional career is truly uncertain.'89 Consequently, he does not
even participate in many of the practice rounds prior to a match,
preferring to save his stamina for tournament play.' 9 Unlike other
golfers, Martin cannot spend hours at the practice range working on his
swing before or after any given round.' 9' Too much practice could
jeopardize his infirm legs, which would cause him to potentially lose
sleep as well as concentration on the course the next day.' 92 In addition
to the mentally fatiguing stress of competition that all golfers have,
Martin must deal with the stress of potentially suffering from serious
injury with every step he takes. 93
181. Id. at 1251-52
182. Id. at 1251.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1251-52.
185. Shapiro, supra note 142.
186. Gray, supra note 138; see also Shapiro, supra note 142.
187. Shapiro, supra note 142.
188. Id.
189. Gray, supra note 138; Shapiro, supra note 142 (indicating that if Martin was not
restricted by KTW he would be among the top twenty-five golfers because of his talent).
190. Shapiro, supra note 142.
191. Id.
192. Id. Martin's main weapon against the pain caused by KTW is regularly taking
Advil. Id. Advil is not a sponsor of Casey Martin. Id.
193. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1251-52 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204
F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), af'd, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001); see also Shapiro, supra note 142
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Ford Olinger's degenerative hip condition causes similar fatigue and
stress.'94 Like Martin, Olinger risks the possibility of serious injury with
one misstep."'
Coupled with the unique circumstances of Martin and Olinger's
disorders of fatigue and stress is the seemingly irrefutable evidence of
Martin's mediocre performance against other golfers since being allowed
to use a cart in competition. 96 In the 1999-2000 season, Martin's first as a
professional, he has "made the cut in only 12 of his 23 events on the PGA
Tour."'97 As a result, he is in danger of losing his Tour card for next year
since only the top 125 golfers on the money list are allowed back the
following year and Martin is close to $400,000 short of making the cut.9
Martin's best finish of the year was a tie for seventeenth in the Tucson
Open in February 2000, a tournament in which sixty-five of the world's
best golfers were not even competing. 99 This information seems to cast
real doubt on the PGA's prophecy that permitting a disabled golfer to
use a cart will allow for a competitive advantage, since Martin may be cut
from the tour after one season as a professional at the PGA level."m
A University of Maryland study casts further doubt on the competitive
advantage argument.9 1 The study's findings indicate that among the
golfers who participated in the study, there was no significant effect on
scoring performance of those who chose to ride versus those who chose
(noting that "[diuring this year's Nissan Open ..., Martin stepped into a hole hiding a
sprinkler and admitted afterward he wondered if his golf career would be over just as he
was getting started on the PGA Tour").
194. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Il. 1999), aff'd,
205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001) (mentioning that unlike
Martin, Olinger takes medication that directly causes fatigue while golfing, whereas
Martin's fatigue is directly related to his disability).
195. Judge Denies, supra note 11.
196. Martin's Case Going to Highest Court, supra note 137.
197. Id.; see also PGA Tour Statistics, at http://espn.go.com/golfonline/tours/
pga/statistics/drivingdistance/html (last modified Sept. 24, 2000) (stating that despite his
less than spectacular record at making the cut in the PGA's tournaments, which generally
requires you to be within ten shots of the leader after two rounds, Martin is ranked third in
driving distance among all PGA golfers behind only John Daly and Tiger Woods).
198. Martin's Case Going to Highest Court, supra note 137. At the time of this
Comment, there were only eight tournaments left on the PGA Tour's calendar for Martin
to make enough money to be invited back for another year and retain his Tour card. Id.
If he fails to retain his tour card, in order to become a player on the PGA Tour, he will
have to go back to the Tour's Qualifying School. Id.
199. Id. The Tucson Open occurred during the same time that the top sixty-five
players in the world were at the Match Play Championship. Id.
200. Id.
201. Brian Hewitt, Study: Finding No Advantage, GOLFWEEK, Feb. 21, 1998, at
http://www/golfonline.com/news/golfweek/1998/martin/ study0221 .html.
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to walk.2°2 If anything, those that chose to walk received the long term
advantage of increased fitness. °3 Moreover, "walking improves [one's]
circulation, helps regulate breathing, keeps a player loose, and puts a
player in touch with the more aesthetic aspects of the game. ''204 These
are all benefits that Martin and Olinger do not receive and the PGA and
205USGA find of no consequence.
IV. DOES THE USE OF A GOLF CART FUNDAMENTALLY ALTER THE
NATURE OF COMPETITION?
At the center of the PGA and the USGA's competitive advantage
argument is the suggestion that the use of a cart will fundamentally alter
the nature of their competitions.206 The PGA and USGA contend that
walking the course is fundamental to the game of golf and if the walking
rule were eliminated from the competitions, their tournaments would
essentially be altered. 7
However, the game of golf is defined as "playing a ball from the teeing
ground into the hole by a stroke or successive strokes in accordance with
the Rules."200 Additionally, as indicated by the Oregon District Court,
there is nothing in the Rules of Golf or the PGA's rules that specifically
indicates that walking is required.0 0 Essentially, walking the golf course
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Taylor Spalding, A Call to Arms, Er. . . Legs!, Mar. 10, 1998, at http://www.e-
sports.com/goldengolf/right/martin.asp (claiming that riding a cart is not an advantage).
Spalding cites Michael Laughlin in his book, Radical Golf, to prove her point. Id.
Laughlin describes riding a cart as: "Ride, bounce, get out, practice your swing, hit the
ball, get back in the cart, and repeat the whole process over again. This adds 5 strokes,
maybe more to anyone's game." Id.
205. Id.
206. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 531 U.S.
1049 (2001); Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 2000),
vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001); see also S.E. Cmty. Coll. V. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In
light of this case, which held that a requested modification by a deaf nursing student to
substitute different work was unreasonable, several courts have held that the ADA does
not require entities to change their basic nature, character, or purpose to accommodate a
disabled individual. Id.
207. Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000-01; Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004-05.
208. The Rules of Golf, available at www.usga.org/rules/index (last visited Sept. 26,
2000).
209. Id.; see also Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (D. Or. 1998),
affd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001) (finding that this rule
admittedly does not apply to all events). But see Martin, 204 F.3d at 999-1000. The PGA
added to the Rules of Golf what is known as the walking rule that indicates that "[p]layers
shall walk at all times during a stipulated round unless permitted to ride by the PGA Tour
Rules Committee." Id.
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is a "tradition, not a rule."21 Evidence from the district court in the
Martin case even proved that golf cart use is not completely foreign to
the PGA or its tournaments. 2'
Golf in its simplest form, is about making better shots in fewer strokes
212than your opponent. It is a game of strategy, technique, and accuracy,
but not about walking.2 3 Golf is not about racing your opponent to your
ball in the fairway.1 4 What makes a great golfer is the ability to make the
211fewest shots, not the ability to finish walking the course the quickest.
No one goes to the U.S. Open or the Masters Championship to watch
how well Tiger Woods walks. 26 They go to watch his tremendous shot
making capabilities.2 7 In golf's long and storied history, no one has ever
won a PGA or USGA event based on their ability to walk.2 8
Casey Martin and Ford Olinger are not asking for any help in playing
the game, they are simply asking for help getting to their ball. 219  In
essence, all that the cart does for these two golfers is permit them access
to a type of competition in which they otherwise could not engage due to
their disabilities. "' This is precisely the purpose of the ADA.
Arguably, the use of a golf cart is simply access to Martin and Olinger's
212workplace. It does not tip the balance of the competition, but merely
210. Spalding, supra note 205.
211. Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000 (noting that on occasion, the PGA Committee in charge
of allowing golf cart use during competition has allowed golfers to use carts when a large
distance exists between a green and the next tee or when a golfer loses his first tee shot
and after looking unsuccessfully can be given a ride back to the tee box to save time); see
also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248 n.9 (noting that the PGA specifically allows the use of
carts in its Senior Tour and during the first two qualifying rounds at the Qualifying
School).
212. Gray, supra note 138; see also Shannon, supra note 1.






219. Rick Reilly, Give Casey Martin a Lift, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 9, 1998, at 140.
220. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000), aff d, 531 U.S. 1049
(2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1994); He's Got a Ticket to Ride, OREGON LIVE,
at http://www, oregonlive.com/oped/index.ssf?/opedOO/03/edO3O7O9/frame (last visited
Oct. 30, 2000).
221. Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000.
222. John M, Williams, No Tee - or Sympathy - for Casey Martin: Why is the PGA
Going all the Way to the U.S. Supreme Court to Stop tile Disabled Golfer From Using a
Cart on the Pro Tour?, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 27, 2000, available at,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/ dnflash/sep2000/nf20000927_942.htm.
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puts them "on equal footing with golfers who walk from hole to hole., 2 3
In conjunction with the argument that the use of a golf cart will
fundamentally alter the nature of competitions, critics have advanced the
theory that if golfers such as Martin and Olinger are allowed to use golf
carts it will lead down a slippery slope of requiring other sports to make
game altering modifications to accommodate the disabled, such as
moving forward the three point line in basketball or allowing disabled
baseball players to have four strikes instead of three, and so on.224 The
Seventh Circuit seemed tacitly to accept this logic when it declared that
the ADA might apply to places like Green Bay's Lambeau Field or
Chicago's Wrigley Field if the ADA were permitted to apply to mixed
use facilities like golf courses."' While this argument may be persuasive
to some, this logic is misguided.226
There is abundant ADA legislative history, fully supported by case
law, that states that a resolution of issues regarding a reasonable
modification under the ADA is a fact and case-specific inquiry that is not
to be made concerning classes of individuals. 227 This finding undercuts
the strength of the PGA, USGA, and other critics' assumption that once
Martin and Olinger are allowed to use a cart, every other sport will be
forced to abandon their rules and bend to the weight of the ADA.228
In discussing the implications of the ADA, the House Committee on
Education and Labor noted that public accommodations are required to
be made on facts applicable to individuals only and not on the basis of
223. Id.
224. Shannon, supra note 2, at 106 (summarizing Casey Martin's argument in favor of
using a golf cart as a reasonable accommodation and finding that the Oregon District
Court correctly held that Title III of the ADA applies to the PGA because it owns, leases,
and operates places of public accommodation).
225. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated,
121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
226. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992);
Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480,1486 (9th Cir. 1996).
227. Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 345 (indicating that the Little League's banning all
coaches in wheelchairs from the coach's box and allowing for no individual analysis was a
blanket rule and therefore invalid); Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1486 (stating that the
determination of "what constitutes reasonable modification is highly fact-specific,
requiring a case-by-case inquiry"); see also Staff of House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 101st
Cong., Legis. History of Pub. L. 101 -336, reprinted in 1990 U.S.S.C.A.N. 267, 385. But see
Martin's Case Going to Highest Court, supra note 137 (stating that the PGA's lawyers
think upholding the Ninth Circuit ruling will allow an abundance of "workplace
discrimination lawsuits by independent contractors and other non-employees").
228. Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 345; Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1486; see also Staff of House
Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 101st Cong., Legis. History of Pub. L. 101-336, reprinted in
1990 U.S.S.C.A.N. 267, 385.
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facts presumed to be applicable to a class of individuals.229 Further, in
Anderson v. Little League Baseball,2 3°1 the district court held that an
assessment by the Little League that banned all disabled coaches from
the coaches' box and disallowed an individual analysis was a blanket rule
231and thus invalid under the spirit and objectives of the ADA.
Additionally, in Crowder v. Kitagawa,32 the Ninth Circuit stated that the
determination of what constitutes a reasonable modification under Title
III of the ADA is a highly fact sensitive inquiry requiring a case-by-case
analysis.233 In fact, to presume that once one person is allowed a
reasonable modification, that any other disabled individual will get one
regardless of individual circumstances, is not in tune with the intentions
of Congress when they enacted the ADA, nor the interpretation of some
of the federal courts that have spoken on the issue.3
V. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court hears the Martin appeal in January of its
October 2000 term, it will have the opportunity to clarify the debate
concerning the limits, if any, of the ADA in the world of professional
golf, and possibly to sports in general. While controversy and emotion
surround many of the issues in these two cases, the underlying focus
remains whether professional golf associations should be required to
allow disabled golfers the use of a golf cart during their tournaments.
Based on Congress' intent when it drafted the ADA, it seems that while
the legislation was never specifically created to deal with discrimination
in the professional golf circuit, its goal of providing a comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities may not be fully recognized if the Court
allows the provisions of the ADA to stop at the sidelines of competitive
events such as professional golf tournaments. Further, if disability-based
discrimination turns out to cause inadvertent competitive advantages for
disabled golfers, the remedy is a legislative amendment - not
disregarding the clearly expressed will of the Congress. If the Court
229. Staff of House Comm on Educ. & Labor, 101st Cong., Legis. History of Pub. L.
101-336, reprinted in 1990 U.S.S.C.A.N. 267, 385.
230. 794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992).
231. Id. at 345.
232. 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996).
233. Id. at 1486.
234. Staff of House Comm on Educ. & Labor, 101st Cong., Legis. History of Pub. L.
101-336, reprinted in 1990 U.S.S.C.A.N. 267, 385; see also Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 345;
Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1486.
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chooses to disregard the plain intent of Congress when it passed the
historic legislation, the goal envisioned by President Bush when he
signed the ADA in 1990 of allowing the legislation to serve as a model
for the choices and opportunities of future generations around the world
may never be fully realized.
ADDENDUM
Since this Comment was composed, the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin."' Justice Stevens authored a
seven to two opinion holding that Title III of the ADA, "by its plain
terms," prevents the PGA from refusing Martin equal access to its
tournaments on the basis of his disability. 3 6 The Court went on to hold
that allowing Martin to use a golf cart during PGA tournaments would
not fundamentally alter the nature of tour events, nor would a cart give
Martin an advantage over other golfers In fact, the Court noted that
the essence of the game of golf is shot-making,238 and the use of carts
during a game of golf is not inconsistent with the fundamental character
of the game.239
In response to the PGA Tour's argument that using a golf cart is
against the rules, the majority responded by noting, "[t]here is nothing in
the Rules of Golf that either forbids the use of carts, or penalizes a player
for using [one]., 240 The so called walking rule was held not to be an
235. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
236. Id. at 1890. The PGA Tour argued for the first time at the Supreme Court that
Title III is concerned with discrimination against clients and customers who seek to obtain
goods and services from public accommodations and Title I of the ADA protects people
who work at these places. Id. at 1891. On this assumption, the PGA claimed that they did
not maintain a golf course during PGA events, but "a place of exhibition or
entertainment." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, Martin was a provider rather than a
consumer of entertainment and thus could not bring a suit under Title III because he is not
one of the clients or customers covered under the public accommodation language in Title
III. Id. The PGA maintained that Martin's discrimination was job related and could only
be raised under Title I and would be unsuccessful because he is deemed an independent
contractor (who are not covered by Title I) and not an employee. Id.
237. Id. at 1895-97.
238. Id. at 1894 ("The Game of Golf consists in playing a ball from the teeing ground
into the hole by a stroke or successive strokes in accordance with the rules.") (citation
omitted).
239. Id. at 1893.
240. Id. at 1895 (noting that the PGA Tour allows golf carts to be used during the
Senior Tour, the first two stages of the Qualifying, or Q-School, and the open qualifying
events for PGA tournaments); see also id. at 1885 n.3 (indicating that the Appendix to the
Rules of Golf lists a number of "optional" conditions, one of which relates to
transportation).
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essential attribute of the game itself nor an indispensable feature of
tournament golf.14 Moreover, the majority found that "the walking rule
is at best peripheral to the nature of petitioner's athletic events, and thus
it might be waived in individual cases without working a fundamental
alteration.,
4 1
The PGA Tour's claim that the fatigue endured by golfers having to
walk the course was uprooted by a finding that the fatigue from walking
a golf course, traditionally five miles, could not be deemed significant.243
The Court noted that during the time professional golfers walk the
course (about five hours), they have several intervals for rest and the
resulting fatigue is largely psychological in nature.244 Furthermore, based
on Martin's particular disability the majority held that to find that giving
him a cart results in a competitive advantage is a "gross distortion of
reality.
245
In closing, while acknowledging that providing a reasonable
modification for the disabled under Title III can be circumvented if that
modification fundamentally altered the nature of their tournaments, the
Court held that "a modification [Martin's use of a cart] that provides an
exception to a peripheral tournament rule without impairing its purpose
cannot be said to 'fundamentally alter' the tournament.,
246
In response to the decision, PGA Tour Commissioner Tim Finchem
presented the opinion as a narrow one whose ramifications would not
241extend far beyond the facts of Martin's particular situation. In contrast,
however, some viewed the decision as allowing future plaintiffs in ADA
cases considerable latitude in maintaining that certain job requirements
are not necessarily "fundamental" and are amenable to modification.248
But Chai Feldbaum, one of the original drafters of the ADA, indicated
that the likelihood of mass exceptions is not likely since any disabled
241. Id. at 1896.
242. Id.
243. Id. (highlighting the district court's finding that the calories expended while
walking a traditional golf course is equivalent to only 500 calories, or nutritionally less
than a Big Mac).
244. Id. (discussing that under normal conditions, the major factors leading to fatigue
were found to be stress and motivation, and under conditions of severe heat and humidity,
fatigue could be traced to fluid loss rather than exercise from walking).
245. Id. at 1887-88 (citing Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1-242, 1251-52 (D.
Or. 1998)).
246. Id. at 1897.
247. See Charles Lane, Disabled Pro Golfer Wins Right to Use Cart: Court Grants
Martin Exception to PGA Rule, WASH. POST, May 30, 2001, at A4.
248. Id.
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person seeking the ADA's protections still has to show an individualizedS 249
need before any reasonable modification will be mandated.
Regardless of the potential legal implications, the decision has
produced mixed reviews among professional golfers and the media.5 °
Some have characterized the decision as "utterly wrongheaded" because
it allows sports to be victimized by legal intervention anytime someone
feels left out,25" ' while others have steadfastly claimed that the decision
simply allows Martin a chance to compete.252 Despite its criticism and
praise, it will likely take some time before the true ramifications of this
decision are really known. As for Casey Martin, with his long struggle
with the PGA now over, he observed after the decision, "[t]here's no
guarantee that golf will be in my future forever, but I can look back on
this and know I prevailed . . . . Maybe this will make people making
decisions think twice. Now I'm prepared to play golf, just like everyone
else.
, 253
249. Joan Biskupic and Harry Blauvelt, Ruling to Reach Beyond Golf, USA TODAY,
May 30, 2001, at 2A.
250. Sally Jenkins, A Good Walk is Truly Spoiled, WASH. POST, May 30, 2001 at D1;
see also Sal Ruibal, Many Sports Groups Affected, USA TODAY, May 30, 2001, at 3C
(arguing that the decision was the equivalent of opening a modern day Pandora's box).
251. Jenkins, supra note 250.
252. Jon Saraceno, Justice is Served in Martin Case, USA TODAY, May 30, 2001, at 3C.
253. Leonard Shapiro, PGA Commissioner Finshem Says Ruling is Lone Exception,
WASH. POST, May 30, 2001, at D3.
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